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SYMPOSIUM
IN DEFENSE OF NEW SPORTS STADIUMS,
BALLPARKS AND ARENAS
ALLEN R. SANDERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
For sports fans, sports writers and commentators, team owners and
leagues, big-city mayors and a bevy of economists, the decade of the
1990s will certainly be remembered as one with a veritable explosion in
stadium construction and the relocation of professional sports franchises.
Within a few years, 80% of these teams may be playing in facilities built
since 1990, and at a combined cost of over $20 billion.' A complemen-
tary and literal explosion, of course, was the demolition of older
ballparks, or at least the abandonment of them. Comiskey Park, Chi-
cago Stadium, Fulton County Stadium, the Kingdome, 3Corn (a.k.a.
Candlestick) Park, the Astrodome, Municipal Stadium, and Tiger Sta-
dium are but a few of such facilities, some remembered more fondly
than others.
While public officials, local boosters, and league representatives all
point to the tremendous financial and non-financial benefits associated
with having a professional sports franchise and new state-of-the-art facil-
ity in one's backyard, many economic studies have come, more or less, to
the same conclusion: stadiums do not serve as catalysts for economic
development, nor do they constitute good public investments.2 In large
part, this is because consumers merely substitute one item with another
* Senior Lecturer in Economics, The University of Chicago, and Senior Research Scien-
tist, National Opinion Research Center (NORC).
1. See John Siegfried & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Sports Facilities and Their
Communities, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. (forthcoming Spring 2000).
2. See SPORTS, JOBS AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADI-
uMs (hereinafter SPORTS, JOBS AND TAXEs) (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997)
[hereinafter SPORTS, JOBS AND TAXEs]; Robert Baade & Allen R. Sanderson, Cities Under
Siege: How the Changing Financial Structure of Professional Sports is Putting Cities at Risk and
What to Do About It, in ADvANcEs IN rm ECONoMICS OF SPORT 77 (Wallace Hendricks ed.,
1997); MARK S. ROSENTRAuB, MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS: THE REAL COST OF SPORTS AND
WHO'S PAYING FOR IT (1997); DEAN V. BAiM, THE SPORTS STADIUM AS A MUNICIPAL IN-
vESTmENT (1994); ENNEH L. SHmoPsHmn, THE SPORTS FRANCHISE GAME (1995).
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in their dollar and time allocations for recreation and entertainment, or
in the case of city and state government officials, there is a comparable
substitution in their capital and operating budgets, reallocating monies
that otherwise would have gone to schools, pot-hole repairs, and police.
While franchises and new stadiums may create a few jobs, they do so at a
relatively high per-job cost. In addition, there are substantial leakages
- monies that leave the immediate metropolitan area, such as portions
of owners' profits, players' salaries and revenue-sharing obligations -
that significantly reduce the potential expenditure impacts.
Furthermore, one also has to factor in the substantial leverage that a
cartel, such as the National Football League (NFL), or Major League
Baseball (MLB), has in any negotiations with a city. If that unit exer-
cises its market power effectively, some of the economic benefits that
might otherwise accrue to a metropolitan area from having a new team
or facility will be siphoned off in the form of both, up-front commit-
ments, and subsequent multi-year subventions by the league and its
members, leaving the city no better off with a team or new building than
without one. Thus, team or Chamber of Commerce estimates of a
franchise or a facility contributing several hundred million dollars annu-
ally to an urban area are likely off by at least a decimal place (that is, ten
percent of the announced dollar figure may be much closer to financial
reality than that touted publicly).
Moreover, in terms of revenues and employment, sports franchises
are relatively small financial fish located in very large economic ponds.
It is perhaps not surprising that empirical work by economists leads to a
"no-impact" conclusion. Even leaving aside substitutions, leakages, and
net-versus-gross estimates of value added, adding a commercial entity
that generates $50 million to $100 million in gross revenues in a metro-
politan area that may have a "gross local product" of $100 billion or
more, is simply too small to matter or to measure with sufficient preci-
sion in any econometric analysis? Finally, and on the other hand, any
accurate financial accounting would likely fail to capture most important
roles in terms of culture, socialization, and identification that sports play
in American society today, interests and activities that do not go through
a cash register or appear on ledgers.
In sum, the empirical evidence suggests strongly that the primary
beneficiaries of stadium construction and team relocations are the cartel
3. This also holds for the aggregate economy, where expenditures in the sports industry,
properly defined (that is, netting out "double counting" and other embellishments) is only
0.1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
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leagues, team owners, players, and diehard fans, while the losers are tax-
payers, both locally and nationally, and the net bottom-line impact is
minimal. Thus, with no potential efficiency gains to capture and some
likely equity concerns, one would be hard-pressed to argue for the allo-
cation of substantial public funds to support such activities on economic
grounds alone.
These new stadiums, ballparks, and arenas - deemed amusement
parks for millionaires by some critics - are not necessarily bigger. In
fact, in some cases they are considerably smaller than the ones they re-
place.4 The "new" Comiskey Park is the same size as the one it replaced.
The Ballpark at Camden Yards and Safeco Field are smaller than Munic-
ipal Stadium, Memorial Stadium and the Kingdome respectively5 How-
ever, they have some common characteristics; they are larger on the
outside, more expensive to build, more luxurious on the inside, and in-
clude a redistribution of seats more toward luxury suites and premier
boxes. They also contain more amenities such as Diamondvision score-
boards with instant-replay features, museums and gift shops, more mar-
keting promotions and fireworks displays, and an array of food and
beverage emporiums. They are for single-use or single-sport purposes
(even now in ice hockey and basketball), and many are being erected in
city-center locations, with public funding, directly or indirectly, constitut-
ing a large proportion of the total outlays.
There have been many reasons put forth on both, or perhaps more
appropriately, all sides, to explain the rate at which new facilities are
being erected, the decidedly upscale nature of them, and the increased
share of public financing behind them. A growing corporate culture, the
widening inequality of income in this country (which some authors con-
tend has catered to the "haves" with regard to the more affluent sport
fans), standard public choice theory (in which special interests prevail),
and tax laws which offer implicit subventions for public construction, are
three such arguments. However, it is the contention of this paper that in
addition to those now-familiar positions there are a set of alternative
theoretical points and considerations some of which represent the nor-
mal ebb and flow of economic activity and the underlying state of the
economy, many of which are far more mundane, benign, and certainly
4. This was not always the case; as steel and concrete replaced wood as the principal
construction materials after the turn of the (last) century, it was possible to expand the vertical
dimensions of stadiums, and thus seating capacity increased accordingly. The fact that in most
instances these new facilities simply replace existing ones is also a complementary argument
why there is little new net spending in an area attributable to a stadium.
5. New arenas in the NBA, however, tend to be larger than the ones they replace.
2000]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
less sinister than either proponents or opponents of teams and facilities
have allowed, that may go a long way toward explaining this alleged con-
struction boom in the American professional sports industry, as well as
the proportion of it that involves public funding.
The sections that follow provide a brief summary of the traditional
stadium arguments and evidence, discuss commercial and personal
changes in a dynamic economy in general, place the current sports facil-
ity boom in a broader context, and offer alternative, or at least comple-
mentary theoretical explanations, to account for public and private
decision making as it relates to financing these buildings. Conclusions
are presented in the final section. Although providing more questions
than answers, the discussions below should nevertheless suggest ways in
economic theory and empirical research that can shed additional light on
what have been to date very heated debates.
II. Tim TRADIroNAL ARGUMENTs AND EVIDENCE
As espoused by proponents of building a new sports stadium or at-
tracting a new, or existing, professional sports franchise (generally the
league itself, a team's owner(s), and some segment of the political lead-
ership, i.e., a mayor, city council, governor, or state legislature), there
are both tangible and intangible reasons behind wanting a team or a new
facility. The former include the set of quantitative, or at least theoreti-
cally quantifiable, benefits: increased business activity, greater employ-
ment and tax revenues in general, being able to "import" revenues from
(or "export" services to) regional or even national constituencies, or the
revitalization of a particular area of the city in particular. The latter in-
lude the more qualitative appeals such as city unity, "civic pride," and
some notion of the team conferring "big league status" on the
community.
Unfortunately for these boosters, as noted above, there is a large and
growing body of economic literature that purports to debunk the asser-
tions of direct economic benefits from the presence of a new team or
new facility.6 These scholars then turn to an alternate explanation for
the flurry of activity: special-interest groups - the leagues, team owners,
rabid fans, construction unions, the media, and so forth - that engage in
rent-seeking behavior to tap local and national funds for their own bene-
fits, as well as potential subventions via current tax policies and flawed
accounting estimates that ignore opportunity costs, or city-owned prop-
6. See SPORTS, JOBS AND TAXEs, supra note 2; Baade & Sanderson, supra note 2; ROsENi-
TRAUB, supra note 2; BAiM, supra note 2; SiiRorsman, supra note 2.
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erty, or assign costs to other ledgers, or bury them altogether, providing
incentives for cities and teams to build stadiums and to build them with
public dollars.
However, the second set of benefits - those that are indirect, some
of which may nevertheless be theoretically measurable - have received
less notice, except in the rather inflated rhetoric and claims of those ad-
vocating public action. In addition, it is possible that the observed be-
havior on the part of cities, teams, and fans has relatively little to do with
special-interest groups, rent seeking, cartel theory and public tax poli-
cies, though each of these may "aid and abet" what may otherwise be
rather natural personal and commercial behavior when examined in the
context of the larger economic environment.
Although most of the arguments and evidence turn on questions of
efficiency - that is the extent to which the expenditure of public monies
constitutes a wise investment of tax dollars, and thus "more than pays
for itself" through increased employment, higher retail volume and tax
revenues, and revitalization of some inner-city area within the metropol-
itan region. There are also equity, or fairness issues to consider, such as,
do stadiums, whatever their rate of return, entail redistributions of
wealth, specifically transfers of income from lower- and middle-income
taxpayers to the more well-heeled, team owners, players, affluent fans,
local and national corporate interests? Or, do taxes on hotels, rental
cars, and restaurants to pay for construction tap the wealthier segments
of the local and "foreign" population instead of the relatively poor?7
For the most part, this paper is more concerned with why stadiums are
being built at an allegedly accelerated pace, and considers their relative
opulence, rather than their overall economic impact, or the incidence of
costs and benefits.
A related equity issue surfaces in the sports economics literature as
well. Forced to choose between well-heeled owners and tattoo-laden
athletes, or billionaires versus mere millionaires respectively, in conten-
tious labor-management disputes such as strikes and lockouts, some
economists and the majority of media members come squarely down on
the side of players. By extension, when the subject turns to sports facili-
ties, these same writers remain anti-owner in particular, or anti-corpora-
tion, anti-wealth, and anti-market in general; they decry the expansion of
luxury suites and club seating, as well as the increased presence of
"suits" in them. A less normative and more objective appraisal might be
7. See Dennis Zimmerman, Subsidizing Stadiums: Who Benefits, Who Pays?, in SpORTS,
JOBS AND TAXEs, supra note 2, at 119.
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that there is precious little in economic theory to suggest that in the case
of owners versus players, one party is more entitled than the other to
what are essentially economic rents, or that even monopolists increase
their profitability by responding to consumer wants rather than trying to
thwart them.8
III. NATURAL MARKET FORCES AND PERSONAL DECISION MAKING
On the one hand, as economists are wont to say, there is absolutely
nothing amiss with new business construction and renovations. It is part
and parcel of normal commercial activity. Hotels and malls either reno-
vate and upgrade their facilities and amenities, or they lose customers;
and they periodically migrate, as Willie Sutton would have advised, to
where the money is. That is, they follow population and income changes
nationally and within an urban area. Movie theaters now offer patrons
reservations, "stadium-style" seating, and other personal benefits to
those who are willing to pay for them; the mix between large (i.e., 1000
seats), and more intimate environments (i.e., 150 seats), has also
changed. Performing-arts centers are finding that luxury suites and com-
plementary amenities are not just for the sports world.9
Cruise ships, which attract six million customers a year, have added
ice skating rinks and rock-climbing walls to lure more passengers. Bor-
ders, Barnes & Noble and other bookstore chains provide a wider array
of merchandise - video and audio tapes, greeting cards, book-signing
sessions and lecture series - and now also devote, as a matter of course,
a social corner with upscale beverages and snack items as the line blurs
between simply buying a book and having an enjoyable social experience
in the process.
Airlines use frequent-flyer programs, more business-class seating,
private lounges, and other perks to cater to their most important custom-
ers. To attract faculty members and applicants, colleges and universities
8. When the subject is stadia, writers often tend to forget that in a system in which there is
explicit or implicit revenue sharing among owners and players, the latter benefit as much as
the former when new facilities produce higher team and league revenues.
9. Criticisms of corporate culture by academics and sports writers, who bemoan the addi-
tion of named sponsorships to college football bowl games, NBA arenas, and even the Heis-
man trophy, as well as Fortune 500 Chief Executive Officers owning sports franchises,
overlook the fact that many university buildings, lecture halls and endowed professorships, art
museum galleries and exhibitions, symphony orchestra performances and even individual arm-
rests generally bear the names of corporations or wealthy sponsors. Furthermore, complaints
against the use of Personal/Permanent Seat Licenses (PSLs) by NFL teams in their new stadi-
ums overlook the fact that in allocating prime seating, universities and symphony orchestras
have used an equivalent device for decades.
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are constantly adding to and renovating their research capabilities and
dormitories, expanding and upgrading athletic facilities, and providing
more in the way of cultural amenities.
On the personal side, we trade in our cars regularly for new ones, but
not because one has worn out - today's automobiles are certainly capa-
ble of providing a dozen years' and 150 thousand miles of service, far
more than the odometer readings at the time of the typical exchange.
Nor are we perpetual victims of slick advertising or feel discretionary
income burning holes in our pockets. Rather it is because the new mod-
els are more attractive; they provide enhanced performance and contain
more features, such as air conditioning, compact disc players, fax ma-
chines, television sets, more comfortable seating, additional safety and
security items, and most important of all, cup holders for our Starbucks
coffee and Evian water bottle, another indicator of demand-driven inno-
vations in an affluent society.
At home we renovate and upgrade our kitchens and bathrooms; we
replace the roof and water heater every fifteen years; we repaint, re-
carpet rooms, and buy new furniture; and we replace an existing televi-
sion set with a larger one and buy add-on sets for the bedroom and
kitchen - the majority of United States (U.S.) homes have more than
one television and video cassette recorder. Some of these expenditures
are the result of normal depreciation, but many others stem from cos-
metic, taste, income and technological considerations and innovations.
We even trade in spouses, though the current ones are perfectly
adequate.
Our fickleness extends to entertainment viewing where even the
most popular sitcoms and drama series - M*A::S*H, Cheers, Seinfeld,
Hill Street Blues, L.A. Law, ER - rarely last a decade. A new hit
movie usually vanishes from first-run theater screens within a month or
two. For a new novel or non-fiction work, appearing on the New York
Times bestseller list is generally brief, and there is empirical evidence to
suggest that the stay is getting progressively shorter even for the most
popular authors.
There is also a natural ebb and flow for the human body. As we age
we acquire eyeglasses, then bi-focals, and hearing aids, we consume
medical advances such as more powerful medications, hip replacement
and open-heart surgery. The market for cosmetic surgery is booming.
And then there is Viagra. Though try as we might through dietary ame-
liorations and supplements, reductions in tobacco and alcohol consump-
tion, wearing seat belts and exercising more, for the most part we cannot
repeal the general tendency for life to wind down and come to a halt at
2000]
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around age eighty-five. Nevertheless, we are not dissuaded by this stark
reality from attempting to soften or even repeal nature's ultimate
constraint.
What determines the pace of these ordinary commercial and personal
decisions? Given normal wear-and-tear depreciation, to a large extent it
is economic growth and the rate of technological change. With larger
incomes and more wealth we "trade up," partaking more of goods with
high income elasticities - foreign travel, private education, recreation,
more expensive automobiles and clothing options, a Lexus instead of a
Taurus, Nordstrom rather than Sears. We consume better food and bev-
erages, and take a higher proportion of them in restaurants; even gro-
cery stores are catering to the changing demographics with more ready-
to-eat items that appeal to the affluent and economize on time. Hotels
and airports offer exercise areas, computer/networking stations, and fax
machines.
The increased power and lower price of computer equipment make
us dissatisfied with anything more than a year or two old. Laser printers
have replaced dot-matrix machines. Compact discs have virtually elimi-
nated the 33rpm album and may soon displace cassettes entirely. Within
the next few years current analog television sets and VCR tapes will also
disappear from the market. As a matter of pure convenience, rotary
phones gave way to touch-tone models. Then technology and amenities,
including the Internet and other uses that employ digital signals, finished
off rotary phones completely. Cellular phones will likely do the same for
hard-wired systems in the office and at home. Where technology pro-
ceeds at a more rapid pace, the price we pay for standing pat is larger,
and thus, at work or play we are more likely to want the latest models
and features, at attractive prices.
The last fifteen years also represent, except for a brief seven-month
downturn in 1990-91, the longest economic expansion in U.S. history.
Per capita incomes and wealth have increased dramatically for a large
segment of the American population, certainly the segment most likely
to attend sporting and other cultural events. 10 It is not surprising then,
that when it comes to both participant and spectator sports, we should
also follow a natural trading-up pattern. The same phenomenon oc-
curred in the 1920s, another sustained period of rapid economic expan-
10. See Shannon Dortch, The Future of Baseball, AM. DEMOGRAPHMCS, Apr. 1996, at 22,
22; Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 1; John Siegfried & Timothy Peterson, Who is Sitting in
The Stands? The Income Level of Sports Fans, in TmE ECONONUCS OF SPORTS: WINNERS AND
LosnRs (William Kern ed., forthcoming 2000).
[Vol. 10:173
IN DEFENSE OF NEW SPORTS STADIUMS
sion; it was an era of tremendous public and private construction in the
United States.
Many U.S. households now have more than one television set, tele-
phone line, and automobile, and families tend to specialize as well: one
television or phone for the family room, another for the bedroom, one in
the kitchen. One vehicle may be a sports utility vehicle (SUN), or
minivan, and is used for hauling larger cargo, more passengers, or simply
for pure enjoyment. The second car may be for more sedate activities or
business purposes. Third cars, and three-car garages, are fast becoming
the norm in suburban and western locations. In a less affluent age, the
family car had to serve these many purposes.
Amateur golfers and tennis players seek an advantage with the latest
innovations in equipment; cyclists and runners are willing to spend freely
to increase their speed and reduce their physical aches and pains. Owing
to a "demand for tradition" and accepted rules of play, the on-field tech-
nological change in baseball and other professional team sports may be
slow or non-existent - there will still be nine baseball players on a side,
and bats will be made of wood. But, the quality of gloves and bats has
changed significantly over time, as have some official rules (use of a des-
ignated hitter in the American League, the three-point shot in the NBA,
two-point conversions in football) and unofficial enforcement, or lack
thereof (the strike zone in baseball, what constitutes "traveling" or
"palming the ball" in basketball).
To the extent that games also constitute entertainment, and any cas-
ual observation of the set of complementary activities at a ballpark, sta-
dium or arena on game day would suggest strongly that the athletic
contest itself may not be the primary attraction for the model patron, at
higher levels of income that means a demand for less personal suffering
and more comfortable seating, better refreshments, and other stadium
amenities. If grass could grow indoors, as someday with technological
advances in agriculture it will, domed football stadiums will be ubiqui-
tous in cold-weather or rainy climates; high-priced retractable roofs in
newer baseball parks such as in Seattle or Milwaukee are the second-
best climate accommodation, especially in areas where rain, heat or cold
are likely impediments. It is the rare car buyer nowadays who does not
prefer air-conditioning, an automatic transmission and a compact disc
player.
The move away from the cookie-cutter combination facilities of the
1960s toward single-purpose stadiums may reflect the power and lever-
age of each league cartel, but it may simply mirror private tendencies
and responses to more affluence - on the individual level we have "sec-
2000]
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ond cars" and in an increasing number of cases "second homes;" the
public counterpart is a "second stadium" rather than a multi-use facility.
Colleges with big-time athletic programs often have separate venues for
football, track and soccer rather than accepting marginal adjustments
and defects in accommodating all three sports in one location. To be
sure, the move toward single-use facilities is consistent with the prefer-
ences of the cartel leagues and team owners who can extract more reve-
nues, as long as they are not saddled with the capital or operating costs,
and who have, with regard to football, conspired to keep the supply of
franchises low enough to create and then accentuate the incompatibili-
ties between a forty-thousand seat baseball park and a seventy-five-
thousand seat football stadium." But it may be equally compatible with
private preferences, and even civic preferences, in an affluent society.
IV. STADIUMS: Ti PACE OF AND NEED FOR CHANGE
As chronicled in several accounts, the decade of the 1990s repre-
sented a period of enormous activity in terms of construction of facilities
for professional sports teams, and the early years of the twenty-first cen-
tury will witness a continuation of that boom and those commitments. 12
While extraordinary in number and dollars, the most recent boom can-
not be understood in isolation; the volume and periodicity both beg for
"relative to what" contexts. New stadiums and renovations of existing
ones are as much a part of professional team sports as the games them-
selves. Relocations of franchises and construction projects have always
followed overall population levels and their distributions across the
country from the northeast to southwest and from city centers to outly-
ing suburban concentrations (and perhaps back),' 3 as well as simple ex-
pansion in the number of franchises within each league and phases of the
underlying business cycle.' 4
11. An expansion in the number of NFL franchises, including additional teams in most
metropolitan areas, would mean adequate seating in the typical baseball park to accommodate
football fans - in Chicago, for example, one team would play in Wrigley Field and another in
Comiskey Park, as they did when the Bears and Cardinals both played in the city, and thus the
need for a 75,000-seat facility for the Bears would seem far less urgent.
12. See JAMEs QUIRK & RODNEY FORT, PAY DIRT (1992); SPORTS, JOBS AND TAXES,
supra note 2; MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, HoME TEAm 235-52 (1997).
13. Only three of the largest ten cities in the United States in 1900 were still in the top 10
by 2000 - New York, Chicago and Philadelphia.
14. In 1900, across what we currently consider the four principal professional sports
leagues, there were a total of sixteen teams - all in baseball. The U.S. population at that time
was 76 million. By 1960 the number of teams had grown to fifty-one (population doubled in
that sixty-year period), with all four leagues represented. In 2000, with a U.S. population four
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Technological changes in building have also facilitated change and
quickened its pace. The early part of the twentieth century, in part
driven by building innovations, saw the first flurry of activity for new
baseball parks as reinforced concrete and steel structures replaced
wooden ones.15 After a period of relative dormancy until after World
War II, the second wave of significant construction occurred in the 1960s
and early 1970s, creating many, but certainly not all, of the new stadi-
ums, and many multipurpose facilities that have been replaced, or are
scheduled to be replaced, in the third large construction boom begun in
the 1990s. The second wave corresponds not only to technological inno-
vations such as improvements in stadium lighting and the advent of tele-
vision broadcasts, but also a period of substantial economic growth.
The third, and current, wave of stadium construction entails not as
much in the way of technological aspects as the first two, nor perhaps
even the physical obsolescence inherent in the early phases, but rather
change in the economics of sports stadiums, as venues themselves are
capable of generating larger revenue streams, and tax codes offer greater
subventions for owners and public officials.' 6 The observed shortening
of the "shelf life" of relatively new stadiums, ballparks and arenas is be-
ing driven more by economics than engineering. Nevertheless, there are
indications that team owners and league officials are not the only ones
on the demand side of the equation. The combination of steady per cap-
ita income growth and underlying income elasticities, along with the ex-
isting capital stock of stadiums, have undoubtedly fueled the observed
construction boom over the last decade and the beginning of a new cen-
tury. Furthermore, the continued melding of sports and entertainment
adds another demand dimension as venues are adapted and constructed
to incorporate these new considerations.
Nostalgia, which seems to be more associated with baseball than the
other three professional team sports, creates compelling stories and la-
ments about the demise of our older shrines, such as Tiger Stadium and
Fenway Park. 7 A more objective appraisal might be that Tiger Stadium
(1912), Comiskey Park (1910), the venerable Fenway (1912), and Chi-
cago Stadium (built in 1926 and former home to the NHL Blackhawks
and then the NBA Bulls), all constructed well before the advent of tele-
times larger than in 1900, there are a total of 118 franchises, or 132% more than at the outset
of the last construction boom in professional sports.
15. See G. EDWARD WirrE, CREATING THE NATIONAL PASTIm (1996).
16. See Zimmerman, supra note 7.
17. Facilities' names in baseball also reflect the difference: They are more likely to be
called "fields" or "parks," as in Wrigley Field or Fenway Park, rather than "stadiums."
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vision, jet travel, air conditioning and computers, were simply outmoded,
worn out, and needed to be replaced.'" They were dank; they had nar-
row aisles, obstructed views, and limited restroom and concession space.
They lacked other amenities desired by today's fans, such as more so-
phisticated scoreboards, expanded drink and food menus, historical and
contemporary displays, and comfortable seating. As the line between
sports and entertainment continues to blur, and the contest itself and
location in which it is played are seen as complementary goods, the qual-
ity of the venue increasingly matters.
One must also recognize that in some cases we simply make personal,
commercial and public sector mistakes, or at least recognize ex post that
what was perceived as a new trend was merely a fad or blip above or
below a longer-term trend line.19 Wide sidewall tires, narrow ties, peg-
leg and bell-bottom trousers, pet rocks, the New Coke, various McDon-
ald's "adult" sandwiches, Y2K emergency supplies, and public housing
projects - Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis and CHA complexes in Chicago -
come to mind. In other instances, such as drive-in theaters and eight-
track tapes, technological change produces commercial dinosaurs. Mul-
tipurpose stadiums, facilities with artificial playing surfaces, and even the
"new" Comiskey Park may fall under these headings. Seattle's
Kingdome was often described in such terms.
Apart from the building boom driven by natural economic forces,
such as income growth, technological change and the growing entertain-
ment demands, there are logical arguments without resorting to booster-
ism on the one hand, and cold, hard theory and empirical findings on the
other to justify spending more total money, and more public money, on
professional sports. These considerations would include: (1) the extent
to which public funding for sports stadiums is different than, or consis-
tent with, changes in public sector commitments for other purposes over
time; (2) the presence of positive externalities and the public-goods na-
ture of sports, which could justify public subsidies; and (3) welfare or
surplus aspects. These are treated sequentially in the sections that
follow.
18. Perhaps clinging to the past with regard to facilities is "a guy thing" - never wanting
to part with a used pair of sneakers or a favorite, albeit tattered, t-shirt.
19. In Washington, D.C. and other political circles the proper phrasing of these cases,
always employing the passive voice, would be "mistakes were made."
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A. The Pace, Relative Levels of Subventions and Politics
Several scholarly studies, and perhaps thousands of media stories,
have described the construction of new sports facilities in the last dec-
ade, both the number and dollar volume as well as the share (depending
upon the assignment of suite rentals, naming rights, and other revenue
streams) that can be construed as public financing. The conclusions are
uniformly the same: Substantial growth in building, more expensive sta-
diums, and a higher proportion of funding comes from various public
troughs.
On the other hand, we may want to determine the extent to which
the pace and scope of stadium construction have expanded, given the
initial capital stock and intervening technological changes, at rates faster
than have occurred in other public and private arenas, as well as the
extent to which public financing is consistent with, or inconsistent with
the allocation of public expenditures for other metropolitan purposes.
In these times of general economic expansion, cities and the federal
government have been able to expand convention facilities, initiate and
complete highway and road-resurfacing projects, expand and renovate
airports, and provide more recreational amenities for residents. In the
1990s, for example, the City of Chicago and State of Illinois provided
virtually all of the $160 million to replace Comiskey Park for the White
Sox and $60 million or more in infrastructure for the United Center to
house the Bulls and Blackhawks.2 ° Over that same time period, how-
ever, with virtually 100% public financing, Chicago has re-routed one of
its major city-center roads (South Lake Shore Drive) and completely re-
vamped another (North and South Michigan Avenue), re-surfaced all
four of its metropolitan Interstate arteries, undertaken massive down-
town recreational developments (Navy Pier, Millennium Park), opened
the third - and by far the largest - building in the McCormick Place
convention center, added extensively to Midway Airport's infrastructure
(roads, a parking garage, and elevated train), spent close to $100 million
in infrastructure in preparation for the 1996 Democratic National Con-
vention, completed its "Museum Campus," extended its fixed-rail public
transportation lines, installed ice skating rinks in a dozen neighborhoods,
demolished and reconfigured substantial portions of its public housing,
implemented plans to improve parks, bike paths, beaches and boating
20. For a detailed description of spending on sports facilities over time in Chicago, as well
as precise dollar amounts for non-sports civic spending in the 1990s, see Robert Baade &
Allen R. Sanderson, Bearing Down in Chicago: Location, Location, Location, in SPORTS, JOBS
AD TAx=: supra note 2, at 324.
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facilities along its twenty miles of shore line, and planted trees and flow-
ers along roadways and in park areas throughout the city. Each of these
projects represents multi-million dollar commitments.
With a mix of public and private support, the city's cultural and edu-
cational institutions have also taken comparable steps to expand and up-
grade the following: an underground parking garage for the Museum of
Science and Industry, a renovated concert hall for the Chicago Sym-
phony Orchestra, a new building for the Museum of Contemporary Art,
and new academic, medical, recreational and housing construction on
the campuses of Northwestern, Illinois Institute of Technology, the Uni-
versity of Illinois at Chicago and the University of Chicago.
Over the last several decades, the percentage of income spent on
health care in the United States has doubled, and the proportion of
those expenditures that have come from government sources has in-
creased commensurately. For example, in 1965, 26% of total health care
costs came from public sources; in 1996 it had risen to 45%, with the out-
of-pocket portion of spending by recipients falling from 42% to 17%
over that period.2
In addition, colleges and universities contain an enormous number of
academic cross subsidies. Although undergraduate tuition is generally
uniform across fields and years of study, it must certainly cost less to
service a philosophy major than a student who concentrates in molecular
biology, and freshmen in large sections receive fewer per-capita educa-
tional resources than seniors in smaller seminar-style courses. A long-
standing contentious debate, in the press and on campus, continues on
the extent to which undergraduate students may be underwriting the
costs of graduate education and research at major universities with their
tuition.
There are clearly special-interest groups in sports, and they extend
well beyond the traditional set of rent-seeking claimants - team owners,
players, diehard fans, construction unions and national, local and cable
television stations. Local newspaper beat writers, radio and television
sports talk show hosts, agents, owners of sports bars, and purveyors of
logo apparel all derive some net gains from not only the presence of a
franchise or facility, but also the team's winning percentage and champi-
onship hopes, which sell tickets, advertising, and merchandise.
The question is not whether special interest groups exist in profes-
sional team sports, but rather how much power they possess in absolute
21. See Statistical Abstract of the United States, U.S. BUREAU CENSUS 118 (1998) (Table
164).
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- that is, the extent to which they can siphon off public monies directly
and indirectly for their narrow purposes - and relative terms, such as
the strength of this particular lobby versus environmental groups, public
education unions, the gambling and liquor industries, sugar and peanut
growers, the American Association of University Press (AAUP), and the
myriad of other special interest groups that walk the land and halls of
Congress. How many of such programs and activities would pass a well-
formulated benefit-cost test? Corporate welfare is certainly not an issue
confined to matters of sport.
In addition to these efficiency matters are ones that touch upon fair-
ness: Through an examination of expenditure and revenue sources, given
overall utilization and tax incidence, does construction of sports facilities
entail more or fewer equity concerns than other programs and projects
paid for largely with public monies, from convention centers and hospi-
tals, to education and recycling, to freeways and airports? The same
question may be asked about the abundance and location of golf courses
and garbage dumps. The answer to that question turns in part on the
distribution of benefits, to which we now turn.
B. Externalities
Although, as noted above, the literature is reasonably clear that
sports teams and stadiums do not contribute much, if anything, to overall
economic growth, to the extent that there are significant positive exter-
nalities or "spillovers" from the presence of professional sports in an
area, one could justify the use of some public subventions on efficiency
grounds.22 In sheer numbers, the impact of professional sports has to be
small; employment on a full-time-equivalent basis is relatively small, and
team revenues are generally well under $100 million annually, modest
totals in comparison with the typical big-city department store, for exam-
ple. Aggregate attendance figures can also be misleading. The typical
NFL team may play its regular season in front of about five-hundred-
thousand home fans, or a significant fraction of any urban area's popula-
tion, and given that football, hockey and basketball rely heavily on sea-
son-ticket sales, most attendees are from the immediate area.'
However, if the typical fan attends three games - season tickets are
22. These externalities or spillovers could of course be negative in some cases: increased
traffic congestion around the stadium on game day/night and perhaps, as some have argued,
increased aggression in society as a whole as a result of watching and then imitating violent
on-the-field behavior.
23. Average NFL attendance is about sixty-one thousand per game, and during the regu-
lar season each team plays eight home games.
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generally shared among small business, social or family groupings - this
may represent less than three percent of the population of a large MSA.
The same approximate proportions would hold true for basketball and
ice hockey as well; baseball, which plays many more games and sells
fewer season tickets, would be slightly higher. A downtown summer fes-
tival such as "The Taste of Chicago," which runs for approximately ten
days, will attract a larger audience than the Cubs or White Sox for an
entire season, and attendance at the Art Institute of Chicago will rival
that of any of the city's five professional sports teams over a twelve-
month period.
There is, however, ample casual empirical evidence to suggest that
the role of and interest in sports extends well beyond the turnstile tallies,
and that beneficiaries are more likely to be "consuming" this "good" in a
myriad of indirect ways. Local evening news programs devote one seg-
ment to weather and one to sports; no other aspect of urban living has a
regular, dedicated slot, and extreme conditions in weather or athletics
(i.e., the local team has achieved a stunning victory or gone down to a
crushing defeat) may even be the lead story on the ten o'clock news.
Weather, business news, sports scores, and winning lottery numbers are
the staple fare on news radio stations. One section in four in the USA
Today and the Chicago Tribune - and periodically on the front page
and editorial columns as well - are devoted to the world of sports.
These newspapers and news programs all have alternative ways to fill
pages and minutes; were sports not so important to readers, viewers, and
listeners they would certainly switch to something else.24
The recent deaths of Joe Dimaggio, Payne Stewart, Wilt Chamberlin
and Walter Payton were accorded the space and reverence akin to that
of Princess Dianna, John F. Kennedy, Jr., and other celebrities. Even
after retiring from basketball, Michael Jordan's every move is still cap-
tured by fans and media outlets somewhere.' Parking levels at O'Hare
International Airport use local sports team names as mnemonic devices
so that patrons can more easily locate their cars. While apparel and tote
bags do not always bear a label, some brand names confer some type of
status and thus names and logos are clearly visible - DKNY, Ralph
24. A recent account noted that in spite of being in an artistic boom period nationally, in
the competition for resources and space, newspaper editors ar6 allocating more space and
reporters to sports and business coverage. See Felicity Barringer, Arts Coverage Falls Behind a
Cultural Boom, Study Says, N.Y. TmIEs, Nov. 16, 1999, at B3.
25. For an account of the size of the pecuniary externality Jordan created during his play-
ing career with the Chicago Bulls, see Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Superstars in
the National Basketball Association: Economic Value and Policy, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 586 (1997).
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Lauren/Polo, Tommy Hilfiger, Calvin Klein, Nautica, Patagonia, The
North Face, Old Navy, Nike. The same phenomenon occurs with t-
shirts, sweatshirts and caps seen anywhere from city streets to hiking
trails in national parks; they often bear the name of one's favorite sports
team, or in many cases, a university considered strong academically or
an athletic power - Harvard and Princeton, or Michigan, which ac-
counts for the largest dollar volume of licensed college apparel of any
institution (in the 1960s and 1970s, during the heyday of its basketball
prowess, that honor belonged to UCLA).
Another clear indication of the broader importance of sports teams
to communities stems from the almost ubiquitous recognition at the edge
of small "heartland" towns. However modest the actual achievement, or
seemingly how far in the past, roadside signs proclaim that the visitor is
about to enter the "Home of the Vikings, 1988 State Class AA Cross
Country Champions" or similar references to boys' and girls' high school
athletic accomplishments.
Sports represent a socially-consumed commodity. Water-cooler con-
versations and office greetings frequently turn on casual greetings such
as, "How 'bout them Redskins?" Even if ardent fans are not present in
the stands, they can watch games on television and radio, follow their
favorite team or athlete through newspaper accounts, and exchange
numbers and notions with friends, neighbors and colleagues. In the
same vein, one can be quite interested in and conversant on political
matters without attending party conventions, donating to campaigns or
even voting.
There are likely a number of activities that do not pass benefit-cost
tests on the basis of direct scrutiny, but that are nevertheless socially
efficient in a broader context. Sports teams and facilities may be one,
recycling programs another. Studies suggest that, on average, recycling
is an economic loser because the total collection costs exceed the value
of the materials to be recycled. But people, even armed with that infor-
mation, and knowing that recycling is implicitly taking away from other
worthwhile foregone alternatives, such as more police, parks, and street
repairs, or even a tax rebate, may still vote to continue recycling their
newspapers, cans and bottles because the "feel-good" factor is suffi-
ciently large. The corresponding question here is how large the feel-
good factor of a professional franchise or a new stadium is, in terms of
civic pride or even some "existence value."
Many universities may lose money on their athletic programs as por-
trayed on narrowly defined financial ledgers, and not simply because of
"cooking the books" or from operating in a "prisoner's dilemma" envi-
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ronment. However, to the extent that these same institutions can parlay
direct accounting losses - and this inexpensive advertising - into at-
tracting a larger applicant pool from having its football team appear on
television or in a bowl game, or generate greater alumni interest, loyalty,
and donations, it is in their overall self-interest to field those squads.
A complementary factor leading constituents to support public funds
for a new facility stems from basic finance theory: option value. Even if
it appears that current benefits would not justify the costs, voters, and
mayors or city councils faced with the prospect of spending several hun-
dred million dollars on a new football stadium or baseball field or watch-
ing that franchise migrate to another metropolitan area, may respond
rationally in a world where future benefits are uncertain and losing a
franchise may appear irreversible by choosing to preserve their claim to
those potential benefits.
C. Public Goods
Under traditional delivery systems for athletic contests - some fans
in the stands, others at home, in the office or in a bar, whether around
the radio or television set, reading accounts in newspapers or arguing
with friends about a team's fortunes and prospects - the enjoyment of
the game and the broadcast of it have certain public good components.26
In addition, to the extent that there is civic pride in a championship team
that cannot be captured solely through ticket sales or the purchase of
logo merchandise, there are additional free-rider aspects. Sporting
events thus meet the traditional public goods criteria and contain some
public goods elements - consumption is nonrival and nonexcludable,
which also creates free-rider problems - and calculating a community's
marginal benefit of a franchise or a facility entails the vertical summa-
tion of individual marginal benefit curves, not the horizontal summation
as in the case of a private good.' This context could lead to an efficient,
well-informed decision on the part of a municipal government to provide
subventions to a team owner or professional sports league.
26. Putting games on cable television or as a "pay-per-view" selection, as with most cham-
pionship boxing matches, is one way to reduce the public good nature.
27. In theory, property values should increase in an area if the team or facility produced
positive externalities and had sizable public goods aspects. Increased tax revenues would then
capture these benefits, at least in part.
[Vol. 10:173
IN DEFENSE OF NEW SPORTS STADIUMS
D. Surplus
Economic efficiency is achieved when resources are allocated in such
a way to maximize consumer and producer benefits or surplus. It is easy
to confuse aggregate revenues with surplus, and one result is to underes-
timate or understate the level of welfare benefits - or losses. For exam-
ple, during the 1994-95 players' strike in MLB, or the 1998-99 NBA
lockout, media representatives, league officials and others, such as the
U.S. Council of Mayors or individual Chambers of Commerce, reported
the losses from games not played as the ticket and broadcast revenues
that would have accrued had the games not been canceled, plus addi-
tional monies for lost hotel, sports bar, concession and parking expendi-
tures. The figure put forth most often was that each canceled contest
resulted in losses of $1 million or more for the host city's economy. At
the other end of the spectrum, some economists and other social scien-
fists posited that the impact of these labor-management tussles was ap-
proximately zero because fans simply substituted one form of
entertainment for another2s; they attended more movies and rented
videos, shopped in malls more often, and simply drank beer in locations
other than baseball parks and basketball arenas.
However, any measure of the social welfare of a strike or lockout, or
of a franchise coming to town or playing in a new facility, has to include
consumers' surplus. Thus, the economic loss of the strike, assuming fans
could not find a perfect substitute for baseball, or the benefits to football
junkies of having a new team in the city, is the area under the demand
curve, which could be substantially larger than a "price times quantity"
summation. The output multiplied by the price provides a minimum es-
timate, or lower bound of the social benefit. There is at least some casual
empirical observation, including some of the examples in sections above,
to suggest that the demand for sports is not perfectly elastic.
If newspapers and evening news programs could fill their time and
pages with other items of comparable interest, then sports segments and
sections do not contain surpluses. Given the seemingly universal devo-
tion of airtime and ink to sports stories in these popular media, one
might be safe in arguing at first blush that perfect substitutes are not
available. Small towns across the United States could "advertise" any
number of local civic virtues on their road signs, but they overwhelming
choose to honor athletes and their achievements. The same argument
28. See John F. Zipp, The Economic Impact of the Baseball Strike of 1994, 32 URn. As.
Rv. 157-85 (1996); Allen R. Sanderson, Bottom-line Drive, U. CM. MAG., June 1995, at 18,
18.
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applies in international trade. To the extent that foreign goods and serv-
ices do not have close domestic substitutes, then the dollar volume of
imports for the United States, more than $1 trillion dollars annually, un-
derstates the consumption - and investment - value of free trade.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It is certainly not the intention of this paper to condone or endorse
the anti-competitive practices of the professional sports leagues, includ-
ing the current "usual and customary" practice of leveraging that cartel
power to extract hundreds of millions of dollars from the nation's urban
areas and their citizens. Nor does the author particularly agree with for-
mer Cleveland Browns and current Baltimore Ravens owner Art Modell
that for a community a football team is more valuable than thirty
libraries.
The above discussions are meant, however, to revisit some issues that
for the most part have various contributions to these debates holding
what may arguably not be entirely unassailable positions, to lobby im-
plicitly that welfare considerations be included in conversations and
analyses, and to understand why local residents, armed with reasonable
amounts of information that sports stadiums are not catalysts for eco-
nomic growth nor panaceas for what ails city centers, nevertheless still
vote, on average, to underwrite substantially the costs of these new facil-
ities. It would not take much in the way of externalities, public good
elements, consumer surpluses and an option value from a sports
franchise to justify a commitment of, say, twenty to forty dollars a year
per capita on debt service on a stadium. In a metropolitan area of two
million people, that would represent the approximate annual assessment
- $40 million - required to maintain a team and a state-of-the-art
facility.
One would not have to argue for irrationality, a poorly informed de-
cision, special-interest effects, or the blatant abuse of power on the part
of an owner or a league to justify an outlay of that magnitude. Applica-
tions of basic microeconomic theory might be sufficient.
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